potential good homes there are, and that the question of whether to produce 100 dogs with 125 plays a large part, but argues that in the case of future generations we ought to minimize the 132 kinds of diseases and disabilities that limit the quality of life for any person, regardless of her 133 particular preferences (Malmquist, 2008. p 171) . There is much disagreement when it comes 134 to whether we ought to merely minimize illnesses and disabilities or whether we also ought to 135 enhance the capacities of future generations; Julian Savulescu argues alongside utilitarians 136 that we ought to produce the best possible children (Savulescu, 2001, p 415) , while the 137 aforementioned Malmquist as well as Elizabeth Harman merely argues for illness and 138 disability minimization (Harman, pp 93 and 102). Buchanan et al (2000, p 249) and James 139
Woodward (1986) argue that it is wrong to create individuals that fall below a certain 140 threshold -although when all the details are spelled out they tend towards illness and 141 disability minimization as well. The debate between happiness maximizers and illness and 142 disability minimizers may be crucial to questions of genetic enhancement of human beings, 143 but in the current dog breeding discussions the two views would tend towards the same policy 144 -breeding for as physically and mentally healthy dogs as possible. However, if this is the 145 case, the first part of BCM must be false. If we ought to breed as healthy dogs as possible, this 146 is relevant for breed choice as well, not just for the breeding decisions we make within a 147 breed. 148
All the above-mentioned philosophers have, of course, discussed human procreation rather 149 than dog breeding. However, that is of no consequence here. If dogs, as many suppose, have a 150 lower moral status than human beings, this merely means that pro tanto reasons that stem 151 from canine wellbeing might be outweighed by other factors that would not suffice to 152 outweigh corresponding human wellbeing pro tanto reasons, but the difference in moral status 153 would make no difference to the pro tanto reasons themselves. The common pre-theoretical 154 intuition that we ought to produce as much wellbeing or as little illness and disability as 155 possible, which a large number of philosophers have shown can be defended from a variety of 156 moral-philosophical standpoints, is as relevant for dogs as for humans. It is the counter 157 arguments that are specifically human. 158 there no counter arguments to the thesis that we ought to maximize wellbeing other than those 228 from disability advocates, already dismissed as being of little relevance for dogs? 229
According to David Wasserman, procreation is right when at least some of the reasons one 230 has for creating a certain individual are concerned with her own good and the prospect of 231 respectful relationships (Wasserman, 2005, conclusion) . This means that it can be morally 232 right to deliberately create an individual with some kind of disability. Wasserman writes 233
234
It is not clear that this evolving understanding of the family would condemn the 235 deliberate selection of a retarded child. ... they may seek a child whom they would 236 find it especially rewarding to rear or whom they expect to have a rare capacity 237 for sustained, unalloyed joy. These reasons may be self-indulgent or misguided, 238 but to the extent that they concern the good of the future child, they are subject 239 only to a gentler, less personal reproach. (Ibid ) 240 241 I do not think that Wasserman ever considered this line of reasoning to be applicable to any 242 other species than ours (he discusses the purpose of having families in connection with 243 reasons for having children), but it seems to me that the reasons Wasserman gives for 244 deliberately selecting a mentally handicapped child might be brought up by a dog breeder 245 who wants to defend her choice of a sickly and/or mentally unstable breed. She might say that 246 although this breed has its problems, she finds breeding them and living with them especially 247 rewarding -they have unique personalities or traits that one does not find in other dogs. 248
Actually, I do not think this is an unusual explanation of why one chooses to breed a very 249 sickly breed. However, I doubt that one can find a case where it is true that the dogs of a very 250 sickly breed really have a unique personality. It is hard to see how a breed unique personality 251 could develop unless the breeders actually select for a unique personality when choosing 252 breeding animals by, say, using a mentality assessment test on prospective breeding animals 253 and only let these animals reproduce who have particular, different from all other breeds, test 254 results. Alternatively a unique personality might develop within a breed if this and only this 255 breed is bred for performing a particular task that requires a particular personality. However, 256 one would be hard pressed to find a breed with lots of health problems where breeding 257 animals are selected for their ability to perform a particular task that no other breed is used for. 258
A breeder defending her choice of breed in this way would thus most likely be misguided. 259
